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Summary 
In this thesis I analyze the degree to which a coordination of EU gas purchases under an EU 
single buyer structure will allow the EU to countervail Russia’s market power within the EU 
gas market – as proposed by Donald Tusk (the Polish proposal). The background for this 
choice of research subject it at the one hand the rising import dependency of the EU and at 
the other hand the increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, which combined has 
resulted in concerns for the EU’s security of supply. In particular, it is claimed that the 
Russian state owned gas company Gazprom is abusing its position as a monopoly or 
dominant supplier to Central and Eastern European Member States by imposing unfair prices 
and non-commercial clauses in the supply contracts signed with these national markets. The 
Polish proposal is the most comprehensive and detailed proposed solution to the EU energy 
supply question to come forth so far. Although the single buyer mechanism – one of six 
‘pillars’ of the Polish proposal – was not included in the European Commission’s Energy 
Union framework published this spring, it is nonetheless of analytical value to assess the 
logic applied by Tusk in this specific pillar, as it provides us with improved understanding of 
what problems the EU is currently facing what regards its security of (Russian gas) supply. In 
this thesis, I set the scene for my analysis by delving into the organization and functioning of 
the EU gas market, as well as the historical origin of EU-Russian gas trade. I argue that the 
problem currently facing the EU is one of Russian market power - or rather, one of lack of EU 
buyer power. The problem is also of a political nature as the EU’s energy acquis now extends 
so far east that it applies in areas where Russia has monopoly ownership over the gas grid, 
and as such, creates a regulatory overlap.   
I have used the conceptual framework of countervailing power, as provided by Galbraith 
(1952) to analyze the problem solving potential of the Polish proposal. As the concept of 
countervailing power – to balance out an existing powerful market player by establishing an 
equally powerful market player at the opposite side of the market – is not universally 
accepted, I have supported my analysis on more contemporary literature on buyer power. 
This literature supports Galbraith’s argumentation. Two prerequisites must be present for 
countervailing power to deliver the desired result; 1) the ability of buyers (in this case) to 
organize behind a common position vis-à-vis a dominant seller, and 2) the ability to create 
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for the seller a scarcity of demand through own market behavior, e.g. withholding demand 
or switching to another supplier (outside options ). I have analyzed the EU’s buyer power 
under two scenarios according to the prerequisites for countervailing power identified by 
Galbraith; the current unorganized buyer structure and the single buyer structure. I have 
focused on the buyer power of the Baltic market (Estonia, Latvia and Finland) as a test for 
the validity of Tusk’s claim (that acting as a single buyer will allow the EU to countervail 
Russia’s market power) because the Member States constituting this market represents the 
most extreme example of EU buyers without buyer power. It suffices to analyze the effect of 
the Polish proposal on Russia’s market power in this market, as the EU as a whole is only as 
strong as its weakest Member State. I have discarded the countervailing power potential of 
the Polish proposal on the grounds that it does not reduce Russia’s market power in the 
Baltic market. The Polish proposal should nonetheless not be discarded completely, as its 
implementation could enhance the overall compliance with the EU energy acquis, facilitate for 
improved coordination and information gathering, as well as enhanced market monitoring. Based on 
my analysis, the EU should focus on improving the interconnection between the fragmented 
markets, as this would enhance the buyer power of the Union as a whole.   
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Can a united Europe end Russia’s energy stranglehold?  
An assessment of the potential for European Union countervailing power 
in EU-Russian gas trade 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In a Financial Times article published last spring, then prime minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, 
revived the idea of creating an Energy Union for the European Union (EU) (Tusk, 2014a). The 
background for this article was Tusk’s non-paper Roadmap towards an Energy Union for 
Europe, which he submitted to the Commission in April last year, two weeks prior of the 
above mentioned Financial Times article (Polish government, 2014). In this non-paper, Tusk 
argued that the EU should create an Energy Union to increase the energy security of the EU, 
and spelled out six pillars upon which such an Energy Union should be built – each 
addressing a specific dimension of the EU’s energy security. One of the pillars of what has 
become known as the Polish proposal has been deemed extremely controversial and been 
subjected to much criticism; the idea of coordinating all gas purchases under a supranational 
Gas Supply Agency so as to allow the EU to buy gas as a single buyer. According to Tusk, the 
EU should act as a single buyer when purchasing gas, as this would allow the EU to 
countervail Russia’s market power at the EU gas market – a power that Tusk has referred to 
as an ‘energy stranglehold’ (Tusk, 2014a). In this thesis, I will assess the validity of this claim.  
While the idea of an Energy Union is as old as the EU itself, there is something special about 
the ideational relaunch provided by Tusk. First, it reflects a perception of energy security 
that is particular for the newest member of the Union. As Piotr Serafin, Tusk’s European 
Affairs Minister at the time, has argued, the proposal was meant to be “the voice of Central 
and Eastern Europe on security of supply” (Beckman, 2015). Where Western European EU 
members are known to regard energy security as a matter of economics, Eastern and Central 
European members regard it as a matter of security policy (Esakova, 2012, p. 44). As most of 
these newest members are, for historical reasons, completely dependent on Russian gas 
imports and subjected to extensive Russian market power – a stark contrast to the 
diversified supply portfolios and strong bargaining power of the Western members – energy 
politics amounts to so much more than the conventional definition of security of supply 
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(adequate supplies at affordable prices); its also a matter of resisting the political influence 
that arises out of dependence on Russia. This consideration has yet to be properly addressed 
at the Union level, although it was mentioned in the Commission’s Energy Union Package, 
published this spring:  
“Energy policy is often used as a foreign policy tool, in particular in major energy 
producing and transit countries. This reality has to be taken into account when 
discussing Europe’s external energy policy” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 6). 
Second, Tusk’s timing could hardly have been better. The non-paper was submitted to the 
Commission less than a month after the Russian invasion of Crimea and aggression in 
Ukraine, a vital transit country for Russian gas imports to Central and Eastern Europe. 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has served to reinforce Russia’s poor reputation arising out of 
the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes of 2006 and 2009 as well as a line of allegations against 
Russia in which it is claimed that the country has abused its market power at the EU gas 
market. Many now share the opinion of Tusk; “…Russia is not our strategic partner. Russia is 
our strategic problem” (Foy, 2014). The timing was right also what regards the political 
climate within the EU institutions. With the election of Jean-Claude Junker – an outspoken 
proponent of an energy union - as president of the Commission on the 15th of July last year, 
impetus was given to the project from within the Commission. This impetus was particularly 
visible in the appointment of a wholly new Commissioner position; the vice-president of the 
Energy Union. The Energy Union is one of Junkers top-ten priorities for his term in office. 
Speaking ahead of the vote, Junker argued that  
“Current geopolitical events have forcefully reminded us that Europe relies too 
heavily on fuel and gas imports. I therefore want to reform and reorganize Europe’s 
energy policy into a new European Energy Union. We need to pool our resources, 
combine our infrastructures and unite our negotiation power vis-à-vis third 
countries” (Junker, 2014, p. 5).  
On the 30th of August last year, Tusk was elected president of the European Council. As it is 
this Council in cooperation with the Commission that sets the general political direction for 
the EU, the scene seems to be set for a very real effort towards the establishment of an 
energy union. While the Commission did not include the single buyer proposal in its Energy 
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Union Package published this spring – also arguing for the creation of an energy union- it is 
nonetheless interesting to assess the potential of the Polish proposal to mitigate Russian 
market power at the EU gas market as it provides a great backdrop for exploring what 
obstacles are currently facing the EU in terms of ensuring the Member States’ security of 
supply.   
The reason why Russia’s invasion of Crimea provided such a pungent backdrop for the 
Energy Union debate is due to the increasing import dependency of the EU what regards 
natural gas. As Russia is the number one supplier of natural gas to the Union, the 
increasingly assertive foreign policy of Russia and its historical monopoly over pipelines and 
supply in Eastern and Central Europe is particularly a cause for concern. Russia’s market 
power at the EU gas market has proven incredibly resilient against EU efforts at liberalization 
and regulation, and the country has repeatedly been accused of abusing its dominant market 
position in the most dependent national ‘sub-markets’. When Tusk announced his proposal 
to the public in the above mentioned Financial Times article, this problem of market power 
was presented as the main justification for an energy union:  
“…excessive dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak. And Russia does not 
sell its resources cheap – at least, not to everyone” (Tusk, 2014a). 
1.1 Research Subject 
The focus of this thesis is the third pillar of the so-called Polish Proposal, in which Tusk 
proposes a strategy for the EU to “Strengthen the bargaining power of Member States and 
the EU vis-à-vis external suppliers” (Polish government, 2014). Under this pillar Tusk spells 
out a method for how the compliance of both commercial and intergovernmental supply 
contracts with the EU energy acquis could be enhanced. I will focus on the part of this 
proposal regarding commercial contracts, that is, supply contracts signed between external 
suppliers and EU gas undertakings (companies). For ensuring the compliance of such 
contracts with the energy acquis, Tusk proposes a coordination mechanism similar to that 
performed by the Euratom Supply Agency; a supranational Agency which purchases nuclear 
materials for the EU as a block – that is, as a single buyer. Tusk argues that the EU should 
take the same approach towards gas supplies (Tusk, 2014a). The background for the need to 
enhance the bargaining power of the EU and its Member States is what Tusk refers to as the 
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Russian ‘energy stranglehold’. According to Tusk, Russia has been leveraging its monopoly 
position as sole supplier to the easternmost part of the EU gas market to extract more-than-
competitive concessions from those that have no outside option to Russian gas – hence the 
‘stranglehold’ analogy. Such market behavior is contrary to EU competition law and hampers 
the overall competition in the market. The accusations raised by Tusk are shared by the 
Commission, which has opened an antitrust case against the Russian company Gazprom, the 
only Russian gas company operating at the EU gas market (European Commission, 2012). 
Tusk argue that the problem with Russia’s market power is self-sustaining, because the 
member states who are subjected to it are also those that, by virtue of being completely 
dependent on Russian gas, virtually lack any buyer power vis-à-vis their dominant supplier. 
As such, their hands are tied. This lack of buyer power, argues Tusk, is not endemic to the 
European Union as a whole; especially not to the member states that constitutes Russia’s 
largest European export markets, in particular Germany and Italy. The main assumption and 
crux of the proposed coordination mechanism is that the EU, when united, is capable of 
aggregating more buyer power than Russia, and that the Union should take advantage of 
this and stand together so as to effectively deny Russia its ability to exercise market power in 
the most vulnerable states; 
“A dominant supplier has the power to raise prices and reduce supply. The way to 
correct this market distortion is simple. Europe should confront Russia’s monopolistic 
position with a single European body charged with buying its gas” (Tusk, 2014a).  
1.2 Research question 
In this thesis, I will elaborate on the coordination mechanism proposed in the Polish 
proposal and analyze its potential to mitigate the problem of Russia’s market power.  I will 
contrast the EU’s buyer power under the scenario spelled out in this proposal with the EU’s 
buyer power under the current uncoordinated buyer structure. My analysis will be guided by 
the following research question; will the establishment of an EU single gas buyer allow the 
EU to countervail Russia’s market power? 
1.3 Background for choice of research subject 
The background for this choice of subject is the observation that there is an obvious 
shortage in the ongoing energy union debate: the failure to acknowledge that attempts at 
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making functional the common market for gas are futile so long as this market lack a 
coherent external boundary vis-à-vis external suppliers. Just as the single market for goods 
would have been unthinkable had it not been for the customs union, the establishment of a 
common gas market devoid of coherent conditions for entry seems rather contradictory. 
That the one is pursued without the other is a paradox, and nowhere is this more evident 
than in the Union’s relationship with Russia. While the EU is constantly requiring that Russia 
treat all Union members (with whom it trades) on equal terms – that is, on best available 
terms as if the market was complete – the Union itself cannot project any sort of unified 
energy policy outwards. So long as the EU does not act as a bloc, it can hardly require from 
its suppliers to be treated as one. Russia, of course, refuses to comply. This paradox is the 
foundation for the Commission’s repeated claim that “speaking with one voice” is the key to 
securing the Unions energy interests abroad (European Commission, 2011). 
1.4 Conceptual framework and methodology 
The idea that it is possible to mitigate the effects of existing market power at one side of a 
market by establishing a competing market power at the other side of said market, has been 
conceptualized by John K. Galbraith as countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952). This 
framework will guide my analysis. According to Galbraith, the successful projection of 
countervailing power rests upon two conditions; (1) the parties subjected to market power 
must have a minimum opportunity for, and organizational capacity to, coordinate their 
actions behind a single position; and (2) when united behind such a position, the parties 
subjected to market power must be able to credibly threaten to, through a change in own 
market behavior, inflict a state of not unlimited demand upon the supplier (Galbraith, 1993, 
p. 126 and 131). As the possibility to fulfill this latter condition is determined by the 
relationship between supply and demand on the specific market, it amounts to a question of 
relative market power between buyer and seller. As Galbraith’s framework is abstract, not 
going into the details on the mechanisms underpinning such buyer power, I will support my 
analysis with results from recent academic insight on the topic.  
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1.5 Out of scope 
1.5.1. Supply disruptions 
Part of the concerns with the Union’s import dependency is that of the possibility that 
Russia, by virtue of controlling both transmission and distribution infrastructure, can cut off 
supply flows to the EU market. I will not deal with this aspect of security of supply in this 
thesis. I base my analysis upon the assumption that there is a mutual interest for both the 
EU and Russia in sustaining the current gas trade. 
1.5.2. The uncertain validity of the Commissions allegations against Russia 
Price differences across national markets can have several origins, including the taxation 
levels and market policies of the various member states. The issue of domestic causes for 
price differences will not be dealt with here. For the purpose of this thesis, I will assume that 
the allegations raised by the Commission in its antitrust case against Gazprom are true. 
There exist, however, uncertainties as to whether or not this is the case, as the proceedings 
are not yet completed. The Commission has requested insights into the various supply 
contracts that are under investigation, which has yet to be accepted by Russia.  
1.5.3. The Energy Community  
I will limit my analysis to the part of the gas market that falls within the boundaries of the EU 
proper. While the Energy Community Treaty extends the current energy acquis, including 
the competition rules and the third energy package, into Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine, it is uncertain whether 
an EU single buyer could be extended also to these non-EU members, and they will therefore 
be disregarded in my discussion. 
1.5.4. Outside options in the long term 
While several alternative sources for supply and demand exist for the EU and Russia in the 
long term, I will focus on the opportunities for trade within the current market 
infrastructure. As such, the possibility that Russia might divert some of its European gas 
export to the Chinese market will be disregarded, as will the EU’s potential gas imports from 
the Caspian basin. 
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1.6 Definitions   
1.6.1. Security of supply 
Security of (gas) supply refers to the continuous supply of adequate and affordable 
quantities of gas to the market at all times (Mitchell, 2009, p. 2). The term is part of the 
overall concept of energy security, which previously referred only to considerations of 
security of supply, but now also includes considerations of environmental sustainability and 
international competitiveness (Cherp and Jewell, 2014, p. 416).   
1.6.2 EU energy acquis 
The EU’s energy acquis is a term used when referring to the “core EU energy legislation in 
the area of electricity, gas, environment, competition, renewables, energy efficiency, oil and 
statistics” (Energy Community). When used in this thesis, I refer to the part of this energy 
legislation that applies to the EU gas market.  
1.6.3  Market power and countervailing power 
Market power, by definition, refers to the ability of a purchaser/seller to profitably 
offer/charge a lower/higher price than the market price – often referred to as buyer or seller 
power respectively (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 623). The emphasis is on ‘profitable’ 
because any such offer/charge would result in a total loss of market share under competitive 
market conditions – that is, in a market where no one has any market power. While the price 
in question traditionally refers to actual price, market power can also be used to extract 
political concessions or any other concession on more favorable terms than what would 
have been possible in a competitive market (Chen, 2007, p. 19).  
Countervailing power refers to market power that develops at either side of the market in 
response to the existence of market power at the opposite side of the market (the ‘original’ 
market power). A buyer/seller has countervailing power if he can profitably force the original 
market power to agree upon more competitive terms.   
A market in which there exists a player with market power at both sides of the market is 
often called dual monopoly. I refrain from using this term here, as the conceptual framework 
offered by Galbraith allow us to focus on why countervailing power is established – that is, 
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to restore more competitive market conditions – as opposed to the term ‘dual monopoly’ 
which brings associations to a wholly uncompetitive market.  
1.6.4 Infrastructure and interconnectedness 
The term ‘infrastructure’ is used in this thesis to signify existing pipelines used for 
import/export, while ‘interconnectedness’ refers to the internal EU gas grid, that is, pipelines 
that connect various national markets with one another. While the two need not be 
mutually exclusive, I distinguish between them in this thesis to make clear what part of the 
EU gas market I am referring to.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
In order to understand the mechanisms that underpins the Russian energy stranglehold, it is 
necessary to have basic insights into the specifics of the EU gas market, the nature of gas 
trade, and the origin of Russia’s market power. In chapter two I start off by delving into the 
issue of the EU’s rising import dependency on foreign gas. This section will be followed by a 
presentation of the current structure of the EU gas market, including the structure of gas 
supplies. Special attention will be given to how the nature of gas trade is inherently 
noncompetitive as well as the legislation that has been adopted by the EU in order to 
overcome this challenge. Chapter three is devoted to the historical origin of the EU-Russian 
gas trade, as the current problem of Russia’s market power has roots in a specific historical 
context. In chapter four the content of the so-called energy stranglehold is presented. This 
presentation will be based on the allegations upon which the Commission is currently 
pursuing its antitrust case against Gazprom, the only Russian company operating within the 
EU.  The Polish proposal is presented in chapter five, and an introduction to Galbraith’s 
conceptual framework follows in chapter six. In chapter seven I analyze the potential of the 
Polish proposal to mitigate Russia’s market power. I conclude on my findings in chapter 
eight.   
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Chapter 2: The EU gas market - an introduction 
In this chapter I offer an introductory overview on the current state of the EU’s gas demand, 
import dependency, and the organization of the EU gas market.  
2.1  The rising import dependency of the EU 
Natural gas has made quite an entrance on the European energy market over the past two 
decades. Since 1990, the EU-28 gross inland consumption of natural gas (GICG) has increased 
by more than 20 percent (European Commission, 2014b, p. 44). As indigenous production is 
insufficient to cover demand, the Union is dependent on foreign supplies, and more than 65 
percent of domestic consumption originated from extra-EU sources in 2012 (European 
Commission, 2014b, p. 24). This share is expected to continue to rise on the account of three 
developments.  
First, by virtue of having a relatively lower emission profile compared to that of oil and coal, 
the demand for natural gas is predicted to rise in accordance with the EU’s increasingly 
ambitious goals for reducing the Union’s emission of greenhouse gasses. As the Union 
transitions towards a low-carbon economy – a stated goal in the Union’s 2020 climate and 
energy package, as well as in the newly adopted 2030 framework agreement for climate and 
energy policies - the share of coal and oil in the energy mix must necessarily be reduced – 
natural gas or renewables being the obvious substitutes (European Commission 2014c and 
2015).       
As the use of renewables to a large degree depends on government subsidies due to the 
infant status of the sector, gas will often serve as a bridge fuel for a certain initial period. The 
transition towards a low carbon economy and its impact on the EU energy mix is already 
apparent in the fact that natural gas is the only conventional fuel which consumption has 
increased in the EU energy mix since 1990, as have renewables (se figure 1). For all other 
fuels (oil, coal, and nuclear) the numbers have declined. As the goal of the above mentioned 
2030 framework agreement is a minimum reduction in domestic emission of greenhouse 
gasses of 40 percent compared to the levels in 1990, this trend will continue. 
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Second, the current trend of member states to unilaterally phase out or reduce their nuclear 
industries - much thanks to the Fukushima disaster – is expected to have a positive impact 
on the demand for natural gas. Spain, a country in which nuclear energy accounted for 12.5 
percent of gross inland energy consumption (GIC) in 2012, have prohibited the building of 
new reactors (Bøhmer, 2015, p. 53). France has decided to reduce the share of nuclear 
energy in its energy mix, from 75 percent to 50 percent by 2025, and Germany has decided 
to phase out the industry completely (Bøhmer, 2015, p. 53). As nuclear power accounted for 
around 8 percent of Germany’s GIC in 2012, and coal accounted for some 12.14 percent the 
same year, it is obvious that a rather large share of the German energy consumption must be 
found elsewhere - the natural replacement being either natural gas or renewable energy. 
This is also true for France (see figure 2). It remains to be seen however, whether or not this 
trend is a lasting one, as overall concerns for energy security might just as easily bring about 
a new era for nuclear power as it offers an indigenous source of energy. The impact of a 
reduced share of nuclear power in the EU-28 energy mix on the demand for natural gas is 
thus uncertain. 
Figure 1: Gross inland consumption by fuel (Mtoe) –EU28 
1990-2012. Source: European Commission 2014b 
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Third, the production of indigenous resources is in decline (see figure 2). The fact that The 
UK - the union’s second largest producer of natural gas – changed status from net exporter 
to net importer of gas in 2004 is a telling evidence of this trend (EIA, 2014a). In 2012, nearly 
50 percent of UK gas demand had to be covered by imports (European Commission, 2014b, 
p.72). A similar trend of operative fields being exhausted has been visible in Denmark since 
2004, a net exporter to Sweden and Germany (Danish Energy Agency, 2012, p. 6). In the 
Netherlands – the Union’s largest gas producer and a net exporter- output from the 
Groningen field, the country’s largest, have been temporarily halted due to the risk of earth 
quakes associated with gas extraction, and is also in a general decline similar to that of the 
UK and Denmark (Reuters, 2015). 
Although some developments pull in the opposite direction – like the yet-to-be recovered 
drop in demand due to the financial crisis, as well as the reductions in EU gas demand that 
has resulted from improved energy efficiency across the Union – they are not big enough to 
Figure 2: France, energy mix by fuel – trend 1973-2012. Source: 
IEA 2014, p. 185 
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offset the opposite trend. In Franza (2014), twelve different scenarios on the future gas 
demand of the EU were compared and harmonized. In ten out of twelve, gas demand was 
expected to grow after 2015 (Franza, 2014, p. 30). As all increases in demand must be 
covered by imports, import dependencies across the Union must necessarily increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the overall import dependency of natural gas has increased when looking at the Union 
as a whole, there is considerable variation across the union what regards the role played by 
natural gas in national energy mixes (figure 4). At one extreme we have the Netherlands, in 
which natural gas accounts for 42 percent of GIC (Holz et al., 2014, p. 2). Italy, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, and Hungary follow thereafter, with gas accounting for some 36-39 percent of the 
GIC (Holz et al., 2014, p. 2) At the opposite extreme we have Sweden, in which gas only 
constitutes a 2 percent share of the energy mix (Holz et al., 204, p. 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: EU-28 production by fuel (Mtoe) – 1990-2012. Source: 
Pocketbook, 2014, p. 37  
Figure 3: EU28 production by fuel (Mtoe) – 1990-2012. Source: 
European Commission 2014b, p. 37 
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2.2 The road towards a common market for natural gas 
The structure of the EU natural gas market has undergone profound changes over the past 
two decades, and the Union is currently in the transition towards a common market (the 
process will not be dealt with in detail here except where it serves the purpose of this thesis. 
The subject has been covered in detail elsewhere, e.g. in Eikeland (2011) and Buchan 
(2009)). While officially established in 1998 with the first of the so-called ‘gas directives’ of 
the liberalization process – more specifically, directive 98/30/EC concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas (OJ L 204, 1998) – the market remains fragmented, still 
consisting of national sub-markets due to lack of interconnection between national sub-
markets. Prior of the liberalization process, the EU gas market consisted of separate national 
markets, many of which were dominated by a vertically integrated ‘national champion’.  The 
national champions was state owned or heavily regulated private gas undertakings, often 
engaged with activities along the entire supply chain, from production and imports, 
transportation and storage, to distribution and sales to end users (Buchan, 2009, p. 39; 
Cronshaw et.al., 2008). As such, there was no common market in a physical sense at the 
time of the adoption of the first gas directive, although transit pipelines often crossed 
national borders. The efforts to liberalize the national markets so as to open them up to 
competition are founded upon a belief that cross-border flows, as would result from a fully 
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integrated common market, will alleviate security concerns related to gas supplies, as gas 
would be able to flow according to demand. As competition is assumed to create lower and 
more uniform prices across the market, this would increase the competitiveness of the 
Union’s energy-dependent industry. With the U.S shale gas revolution, EU energy costs are 
currently comparatively higher, thus making the industry less competitive at the global 
market (Financial Times, 2015). It has also been argued that: 
“The freedoms which the Treaty guarantee the citizens of the Union…the free 
movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services – are achievable only in a fully open market, which enables all consumers 
freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers” 
(OJ L 211, p. 94). 
To this date however, despite the adoption of two new and increasingly more ambitions gas 
directives – Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ L 176 ) and Directive 2009/73/EC (OJ L 211 ) - the EU 
gas market is still incomplete both what regards levels of physical integration between sub-
markets and what regards levels of competitiveness between markets that are 
interconnected. While the western part of the EU market is mostly liberalized and 
interconnected, the same does not hold true for many of the national sub-markets of 
Eastern Europe, the most extreme example being the Baltic States and Finland which are all 
completely isolated from the EU gas grid. These member states are therefore often referred 
to as ‘energy islands’. This discrepancy in interconnectedness and liberalization has created a 
divide within the common market, in which the western part pays significantly lower prices 
than what does the eastern part. This hampers the overall functioning of the common 
market.  
Much of the explanation for the inertia of the liberalization process can be found in the 
inherently monopolistic nature of gas supply. As the transportation of natural gas depends 
on extremely expensive and inflexible pipeline connections between seller and buyer, gas 
trade is by nature exclusive. What is more, due to the high investment costs (which are sunk) 
associated with exploration and development of gas fields, the extraction of natural gas, and 
the construction of transport-pipelines, in addition to the long lead times on such projects, 
long-term and large-scale commitments between the involved parties are necessary to make 
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the industry economically viable. In order to ensure that all parties are secured pay-off for 
their investments, gas is contracted in long-term supply contracts, often with a lifespan of 20 
to 30 years. Such contracts have traditionally been used by EU gas undertakings when 
signing supply contracts with suppliers (Holz et al., 2014, p. 22). So-called ‘take or pay’ 
clauses are often included in these contracts, obligating the seller to provide a certain 
quantity of gas to the buyer, and the buyer to pay for a minimum of this quantity, regardless 
of whether or not they are actually ‘taken’ (Holland and Phillip, 2008, p. 610). In this way, 
security of supply and demand is secured for the buyer and seller respectively. By virtue of 
long-term supply contracts, the demand capacity of the buyer is ‘locked’ to a specific seller 
for long periods of the time. This makes new entries to the market difficult, as there might 
not be enough spare demand to justify the construction of a competing pipeline. As 
ownership over supply pipelines traditionally has belonged to the specific buyer and seller, 
third party access has not been granted to competitors as such competition would reduce 
the market share of the seller or buyer. Thus, gas supplies are by nature monopolistic, tying 
a specific market to a specific byer. In order to overcome the problem of natural 
monopolies, the granting of non-discriminatory third-party access to pipelines has been 
made mandatory for all owners operating within the EU gas market (OJ L 211, art. 32). 
However, as vertically integrated companies have an interest in denying third party access to 
competitors, it was deemed necessary to support the statutory third party access with a 
legal separation of transmission interests from the overall commercial interests of gas 
undertakings, so as to create an independent, common energy carrier for the market as a 
whole (Buchan, 2009, p. 25). Through so-called structural unbundling, undertakings are no 
longer allowed to at the same time be engaged in transmission, supply and production 
activities (OJ L 211, art. 9).    
2.3 The current structure of EU gas supplies 
Both national and international gas companies are engaged on the EU gas market. Due to 
the above mentioned unbundling requirement, all of the major national energy companies in 
Europe now operate with various subsidiaries that are in charge of either production, 
imports, transmission or distribution. The figure below illustrates the various steps of the 
natural gas supply chain 
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In this thesis, I deal solely with the transactions that occur between extra-EU producers and 
EU wholesalers in the upstream supply pipelines – that is, in the segments called “pipeline 
imports” in the figure above. These wholesalers – henceforth referred to as national 
companies – negotiate long-term supply contracts with suppliers and are in charge of 
bringing the gas volumes to the primary distribution grid. Traditionally, oil-indexation has 
been used to determine the contracted prices, meaning that the price for gas is pegged to 
that of oil, as these two fuels are considered close substitute. While hub-indexed prices are 
also used, based on the gas-on-gas competition at the various EU hubs, some form of oil-
indexation is still preferred by suppliers. From the primary distribution grid, the national 
companies either sell their imported volumes to large industrial consumers or to the 
retailers, who subsequently sell the volumes to local distributers or end users. Although not 
necessarily national companies, I use the term to signify that, despite efforts at increasing 
cross-border trade, the now unbundled national champions still hold the dominant market 
share in their traditional home markets. As security of supply is vital for the functioning of 
national economies, governments are often highly engaged in the activities of their old 
national champions, cheering them on through subsidies or good diplomatic relations with 
producer countries (Buchan, 2009, p. 39).   
One reason why Russia is able to exercise market power is that the supply contracts agreed 
upon by producers and national companies are wholly exempt from compliance controls 
Figure 5: Natural gas supply chain. Source: IEA, 2014, p. 53 
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with EU law prior of ratification. As such, if non-compliance is uncovered, the contracts are 
already operative, making unilateral termination by the hands of the Commission 
competition authority difficult, as such termination might be a violation of contractual law.     
The EU-28 imports gas from a number of external producers, some of which play a decidedly 
more prominent role as suppliers than others. Russia and Norway are by far the largest 
suppliers of gas to the EU, accounting for 32 and 31 percent of the total EU-28 gas imports 
respectively (European Commission, 2014b, p. 65). Supplies from Algeria Qatar, Nigeria, 
Libya, and Trinidad and Tobago follow thereafter (European Commission, 2014b, p. 65). 
Figure six illustrates the composition of EU gas imports according to country of origin.  
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Chapter 3: Understanding Russia’s market power – the historical origin of EU-
Russian gas trade 
A short introduction to the historical origins of the current EU-Russian gas trade is provided 
in this chapter. In order to understand the complexity of the regulatory dispute that is 
currently playing out between the EU and Russia, it is helpful to have a clear picture of the 
origins of Russia’s market power within the EU. The current EU-Russian gas trade is founded 
upon, and mostly still structured according to, two separate trade relationships that 
developed between at the one hand what was then the Soviet Union, and at the other hand 
two groups of European states – those of Western Europe and those of Central and Eastern 
Europe. The latter group was more or less subjected to Soviet control at the time. The 
historical remains of the different ways in which the Soviet Union’s gas trade with these two 
groups of European countries developed co-exist uneasily within the current EU-Russian gas 
trade, and it is much due to the one sided efforts of the EU to liberalize its gas trade that the 
current relationship between the two has become strained. 
3.1 The Cold War era - the development of the Soviet Union’s export market 
Although the Caucasus and Central Asia had provided the Soviet Union with gas under the 
post-war era, it was the discovery of vast gas reserves in western Siberia in the early 1960s 
that really prompted the development of the Soviet gas industry. In order to connect the 
new field with the major industrial centers of the Soviet republics, the Soviet Ministry of Gas 
launch the development of what became the Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS) - an 
extensive domestic network of pipelines with branches extending into the larger political 
sphere of the Soviet Union (Ericson, 2009, p. 30). The entire supply chain of the UGSS was 
owned by the Ministry, which thus had vertical control over all aspects of the Soviet gas 
industry, from production and transportation to storage and supply (Ericson, 2009, p. 30). 
This network was connected to existing gas fields and extended by virtue of an export 
pipeline to the then-border of Western Europe, through which the Soviet Union began 
exporting large quantities of natural gas in the early 1970s – specifically to Austria, France, 
Italy and Western Germany. This gas trade was agreed upon on mutually beneficial grounds. 
While the Soviet Union needed to boost its suffering economy with export revenues, parts of 
which it could use to import much needed manufactured goods from Western Europe, the 
Western European states were eager to diversify their supply portfolio away from Middle 
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Eastern oil, as OPEC had proven itself an unreliable supplier of energy during the 1973 oil 
embargo (DCI, 1982, p. 17-18). The Soviet market for goods, in turn, provided a golden 
opportunity for Western Europe to bolster its industry, which suffered a downturn in the 
early 1980s (Ericson, 2009, p. 30, footnote 5). Through so-called “pipe for gas” agreements, 
the Soviet Union was granted government-backed loans from these Western European 
countries, which in part was provided as pipes and other gas-related equipment that the 
Soviet Union needed in order to develop its gas industry (DCI, 1982, p. 17). In exchange, the 
Soviet Union agreed upon long-term supply contracts with these countries, some lasting 
until the year 2000 (DCI, 1982, p. 17). The gas volumes agreed upon in these contracts were 
to be delivered through a new export pipeline whose construction was agreed upon by the 
contracting parties in 1979 (DCI, 1982, p. 17). As natural gas was regarded as a substitute for 
oil due to their complementary use, the contracting price was pegged to the global oil price. 
Such oil indexation was believed to provide predictability to all involved parties, as well as 
provide as buffer against unfair pricing (DCI, 1982, p. 29). Compared to OPEC oil, Soviet gas 
was perceived as a reliable source of energy despite the context of the Cold War because it 
was known that the Soviet Union could not afford to divert from its part of the deal. It 
needed to “maintain its hard currency earnings and to preserve its reputation as a reliable 
trade partner” (DCI, 1982, p. 29). Precautions were nonetheless taken; in order not to give 
the Soviet Union too much of an upper hand vis-à-vis Western Europe, it was decided that 
Russian gas should not account for more than a maximum of 30 percent of the national 
energy mix (Cronshaw et al., 2008, p. 13). 
When we turn to the historical development of the Soviet Union’s gas trade with what is 
now the easternmost Member States of the European Union, the story is a wholly different 
one. As can be seen in figure 7, the post-World War Europe was parted in two - the Baltic 
States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) being wholly immersed in the Soviet Union as so-called 
‘Soviet republics’, as were the important transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. The Soviet 
Union also expanded to include several other European countries and the resource rich 
Central Asian countries. Current EU members that were then part of the larger eastern bloc 
by virtue of being so-called ‘satellites’ included what was then East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, as well as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, all of which were 
subjected to Soviet rule both politically and economically, albeit without being immersed in 
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its geographical sphere. These satellites and republics helped Soviet expand its gas industry 
by developing specific sectors of their heavy industries in accordance with the Soviet 
strategy of product specialization so as to be able to provide the Soviet Union and other 
satellites with much needed manufactured goods and infrastructure  (Cronshaw et al., 2008, 
p. 18) In return, the satellites and republics were subsidized with Soviet gas at a symbolic 
price, provided thorough the UGSS – the so-called “gas for manufactured goods” principle 
(Cronshaw et al., 2008, p. 18). For this reason, the independent states that reemerged with 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union were all heavily underdeveloped and highly 
dependent on cheap Soviet gas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Map of Soviet export pipeline to Western Europe. Source: DCI, 1982, p. 
18 
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3.2 The post-Soviet era - the birth of Gazprom and the rise of Putin 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, The Soviet ministry of gas was morphed into the 
de facto state-owned gas company Gazprom, of which the Russian state holds a 51 percent 
ownership share (Müller-Kraenner, 2008, p. 39). Today, Gazprom is the world’s largest gas 
company with its some 20 percent share in the global market, and it holds the world’s 
largest reserves of natural gas as well as the seventh largest reserves of oil (Müeller-
Kraenner, 2008, p. 38). By virtue of its historical origin, Gazprom inherited ownership over 
the UGSS and the various storage facilities of the former Soviet Union. As such, Gazprom 
inherited a predominant position as monopoly supplier to the Russian market as well as a 
monopoly over export to Europe – a monopoly which is currently sustained by law in order 
to keep Russian or other competitors out of the pipelines (EIA, 2014, p. 10). What is more, 
despite the emergence of several formally independent producer states from behind the 
iron curtain, most notably the Central Asian countries, “all export pipelines still ran through 
Russia and were controlled by Gazprom (Ericson, 2009, p. 32). Thus, due to history, Central 
Asian producers wishing to sell gas to Europe must first sell it to Gazprom, who subsequently 
exports it to Europe (Ericson, 2009, p. 32). As such, in addition to having a national export 
monopoly, Gazprom also has a buyer monopsony over most of the Eurasian gas (Ericson, 
2009, p. 32).  
During the 1990s, the gas administrations that had been operative within the Soviet 
republics and satellites were turned into national gas companies (Cronshaw et al., 2008, p. 
22). While Gazprom continued to subsidize gas supplies to existing allies, those that moved 
closer to the EU in hopes of one day gaining membership had to enter though renegotiations 
with Gazprom, which unilaterally replaced the symbolic price of the Soviet era with hard 
currency prices (Cronshaw et al., 2008, p. 22).  
Although still owned by Russia, the UGSS now expanded into several independent countries. 
As such, where Russia previously had control over its exports to Western Europe right up to 
the border of the East-West divide, Russian gas destined for Western Europe now have to 
transit through a ‘wall’ of independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Ericson, 
2009, p. 33). This, however, did only become a problem for Russia after the accession of 
many of these countries to the EU by virtue of two eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007. 
By 2007, the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were granted 
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EU member ship, a fact which meant that parts of the UGSS were now subjected to the EU 
energy acquis regulating the common gas market. Due to the high import dependency of 
these countries, ensuring a proper implementation of the energy acquis has been regarded a 
priority for the EU. Such implementation, however, would require Gazprom to allow third 
party access to parts of the UGSS and separate out the operation of the pipelines to an 
independent operator. This would in theory signify the end of Gazprom’s monopoly – 
although maybe not in reality, given that the relevant markets are subjected to vertical 
foreclosure due to existence of long-term supply contracts that ties demand to Russian gas 
(Buchan, 2009, 29).   
The current problem facing the EU-Russian gas trade is the overlap of regulatory spaces in 
the intersection between the old Soviet border and the newly extended border of the EU 
(and the Energy Community), both being extension of very diverging political goals (Grätz, 
2011, p 62). While the EU seeks to find a way in which the Union’s rising import dependency 
can be decoupled from the political influence that flows from energy dependence, Russia 
under Putin seeks to consolidate its political power through energy exports. The two are 
thus pursuing completely opposite energy strategies. Russia has repeatedly argued that it 
will not comply with the requirements of third party access and unbundling – it is a red line 
that it won’t cross (Lamy, 2004). From a Russian perspective, the rejection of the market 
liberalization is understandable. As argued by Leonard and Popescu (2007), “From Russia’s 
perspective, the West has spent the last two decades rewriting the rules that govern their 
relationship”- a process which Russia for a long time had to accept due to its lack of 
economic and political power in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War (Leonard and 
Popescu, 2007, p. 19). Now, however, with a booming economy and the coming to power of 
Putin in 2000, “Moscow is seeking to revise the post-Cold War settlement itself. It does not 
want to become part of the West anymore and it is challenging all the strategic, political and 
economic agreements that were signed in the 1990s” (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p. 19). 
Under Putin the brief period of “wild privatization” that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has been replaced by an assertive new policy of “state-monopolist capitalism” 
(Müeller-Kraenner, 2008, p. 41).  Through tightening the control over its energy resources, 
Russia is seeking to consolidate its power so as to once again become a great global power 
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(Müeller-Kraenner, 2008, p. 54). The conflict boils down to the very geopolitical question of 
who gets to determine the rules of the gas game.  
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Chapter 4: The Russian energy stranglehold- an issue of market power 
In this chapter I present the foundations for Tusk’s claim that Russia has an energy 
stranglehold on the EU. Common allegations that are often raised against Russia and the 
activities of Gazprom within the EU market will be explored, followed by an overview of the 
Commissions current antitrust case against the company.   
4.1 Common allegations against Russia and Gazprom – the ‘divide and rule’ strategy 
The Russian energy stranglehold analogy refers to specific actions made by Gazprom at the 
EU gas market. I mentioned above that Gazprom has made use of the opportunities for 
market participation offered by the EU market opening and liberalization. Through so-called 
forward integration, Gazprom has been able to buy its way into the downstream segment of 
the EU market and is now participating as a shareholder in European companies operating 
along the entire supply chain. At the same time, Russia refuses to give these companies 
reciprocal access to the Russian upstream sector, and many are therefore arguing that 
Gazprom is taking unduly advantage of the EU market liberalization, offering little in return 
(Finon and Locatelli, 2008, p. 2).  One allegation that has been raised in relation to this is the 
argument that Gazprom is using forward integration (integrating into lower levels of the 
supply chain) to segment the various national markets, effectively hampering competition 
through a ‘divide and rule’ strategy which allows the company to price-discriminate between 
its buyers (see figure 8) (Krastev, 2015).  
It is feared that this strategy will allow Gazprom to “use the opportunities of gas market 
liberalization in order to undercut the EU’s liberalization and market homogenization 
agenda”, and in that way sustain its ability to charge higher-than-competitive prices (Grätz, 
2011, p. 63). Russia is also accused of encouraging Turkey to oppose the planned 
construction of the Southern Corridor, a pipeline which would allow the EU to access gas 
from the Caspian basin while circumventing Gazprom’s pipelines (Finon and Locatelli, 2008, 
p. 2). In addition, Gazprom is cooperating with the Algerian company Sonatrach, the main 
exporter of Algerian gas to the EU, and together they have formed a joint venture for the 
exploration and development of new fields in Algeria (Reuters, 2014). Given these 
developments, avoiding Gazprom seems impossible, and many are arguing that Gazprom 
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attempting to encircle the EU market, shutting it off from alternative suppliers (Finon and 
Locatelli, 2008, p. 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The Commission’s antitrust case against Gazprom 
4.2.1 Background – unannounced inspections 
In August 2012, the Commission opened formal proceedings against Gazprom (European 
Commission, 2012). The background for this case is an unannounced inspection of 
Gazprom’s activities in Central and Eastern Europe carried out by Commission officials in 
2011, which results indicated breaches on EU antitrust legislation (European Commission, 
2011a). The unannounced inspection and subsequent proceedings against Gazprom is part 
of the Commission’s overall effort to ensure compliance with the electricity and gas 
directives that governs the internal market, a process that started in 2005 with the ‘Sectoral 
Inquiry’ into the Western European market for electricity and gas (Riley, 2012, p. 6). In the 
inquiry it was uncovered that there prevailed widespread anti-competitive activity 
throughout the market, a fact that went largely unnoticed by the public media (Riley, 2012, 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of EU wholesale gas prices by country. Source: Matulionis, 2013, p. 7  
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p. 6). The high level of vertical integration still characterizing many of the national gas 
companies was among the most disturbing discoveries. In addition, evidence indicated 
extended “vertical foreclosure of national markets, combined with lack of cross-border sales 
and of market transparency and defective price formation” (Riley, 2012, p. 6). On the basis 
of this inquiry the Commission prosecuted several of the West-European energy companies, 
including the big champions EFD, GDF/Suez, E.ON and RWE (Riley, 2015, p. 6).  With the two 
eastern enlargements a new inspection was due in 2011. The countries that joined the EU in 
the 2004 enlargement (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were not included in the 2005 Sectoral Inquiry as the energy 
markets of these countries had yet to be adapted to the energy acquis by the time of the 
inquiry. As such, the 2011 inspection, which included countries from both the 2004 and the 
2007 enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania), was the first of its kind for these countries 
(Commission, 2011a). 
 
4.2.2 The Commission’s allegations 
Gazprom is accused for being in breach of TFEU art. 102, which prohibits “Any abuse by one 
or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States” (OJ C 326). According to this article (TFEU, art. 102.(a)-
(d)), abuse of a dominant market position may in particular consist in actions such as: 
a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase of selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature of according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.  
 
Gazprom is accused of acting contrary to all of the above mentioned actions. In a 
Commission memo it is stated that “…the Commission’s preliminary view is that Gazprom is 
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breaking EU antitrust rules by pursuing an overall strategy to partition Central and Eastern 
European gas markets with the aim of maintaining an unfair pricing policy in several of those 
Member states” (European Commission, 2015b). This strategy is allegedly based on three 
illegal activities: imposing territorial restrictions that hinder cross border gas sales; charging 
unfair prices; including non-commercial clauses in the supply contract thus making supplies 
conditional upon unrelated commitments. The accusations against Gazprom raised by the 
Commission are elaborated on below (for illustration, see figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.1  Hindrance of cross border gas sales  
According to the Commission, Gazprom is accused of including contractual clauses that 
hinders cross-border trade of imported gas (European Commission, 2015b). Specifically, 
from its investigations into the procedures of Gazprom, the Commission expects to uncover 
the use of export ban clauses and destination clauses in the supply contracts between 
Gazprom and the relevant EU member states. The former refers to “provisions that explicitly 
prohibit the export of gas” after the gas has reached its original destination – that is, it 
prohibits the re-sale of gas-, the latter refers to “provisions that stipulate that the 
customer… must use the purchased gas in its own country or can only sell it to certain 
customers within its country” (European Commission, 2015b). In addition, the Commission 
accuses Gazprom from including “other measures that prevent the cross-border flow of gas, 
 
Figure 9: Illustration of the Commission’s allegations against Gazprom. Source: 
European Commission, 2015b.  
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such as requesting wholesalers to obtain Gazprom’s approval prior of any re-sale or 
exports, or the refusal to change the delivery points of supply flows (European Commission, 
2015b). 
 
The use of such territorial restrictions prevents gas from flowing freely between the affected 
member states, as well as between these states and the Western European gas market. As 
such, the relatively cheaper gas in Western Europe is kept from the Eastern and Central 
European sub-markets, effectively allowing Gazprom to maintain a higher price in these than 
would have been possible had there been competition. This leads to market partitioning and 
“hinder gas from flowing where it is most needed and where prices are commercially most 
attractive” (European Commission, 2015b). Several European companies have previously 
been found guilty of anticompetitive behavior due to the use of such territorial restrictions, 
including the French company GDF and the German company E.ON (European Commission, 
2009).  
 
4.2.2.2  Charging unfair prices 
The Commission is investigating whether or not the pricing mechanism applied in Gazprom’s 
long-term contracts with Central and Eastern European buyers is the cause for these 
Member States paying relatively higher gas prices than what does the Western European 
Member States. The preliminary conclusion reached by the Commission is that much of the 
unevenness in prices are caused by the specific price formulae applied by Gazprom, as is has 
been proven to favor the company’s revenues at the expense of the price it can offer buyers 
(European Commission, 2015b). This does not, however, mean that the Commission in 
general regards the use of oil indexation as an unfair price mechanism. The Commission has 
so far reached the conclusion that Gazprom has charged unfair prices in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (European Commission, 2015b). In its investigations, the 
Commission has compared the national gas prices with a number of benchmarks, such as 
“Gazprom’s costs, prices in different geographic markets or market prices” (European 
Commission, 2015b).  
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4.2.2.3  The inclusion of non-commercial clauses in supply contracts  
On this point, the allegations raised by the Commission are specific to Gazprom’s activities in 
Poland and Bulgaria. In Poland, the Commission argue that Gazprom has made the gas 
supplies to the polish market “conditional upon maintaining Gazprom’s control over 
investment decisions” concerning the Yamal pipeline - one of the key transit pipelines in 
Poland, through which non-Russian supplies could enter the Polish market (European 
Commission, 2015b). As such, Gazprom is accused of hindering Polish attempts at 
diversifying their supply portfolio. In Bulgaria, the allegations are based on the Commission’s 
view that Gazprom has made supplies to wholesalers conditional upon the participation of 
the country’s main wholesaler in the South Stream pipeline project, despite the project 
having an economically unsound profile (European Commission, 2015b). Although this 
project is now cancelled (or halted), the accusation is based on the belief that Russia was 
attempting to undermine a competing pipeline project – the Blue stream pipeline – which, 
had it been successful, would have allowed EU gas imports from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, thus circumvent Russian gas and pipelines.  
 
4.3 The Russian response 
As the Commission faces no legal deadline for completing antitrust inquiries, the case 
against Gazprom can go on for a while (European Commission, 2015b). A protracted 
proceeding is also the expected outcome, as Gazprom is showing no signs of willingness to 
cooperate. In fact, quite the opposite has been the case, and Gazprom is backed by political 
resistance to the case in Moscow. When it became clear that the Commission had started 
procedures against Gazprom, a spokesman for the company made the following statement:  
 
“The actions of the European Commission… can only be seen as an attempt by the 
[commission] to pressure Gazprom and influence prices and the results of 
commercial negotiations, which is clearly in breach of market principles… Right now, 
a series of relatively weak EU economies are continuing to demand from Gazprom 
unilateral concessions on gas prices. You can’t view this as anything other than EC 
support for Gazprom subsidies to eastern Europe. This is an attempt to solve the 
economic problems of the EC at Russia’s cost” (Belton et al., 2012).  
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In response to the proceedings - to illustrate just how much they resent the case - Moscow 
adopted the ‘blocking statute’, a decree that “aims to protect ‘strategic’ companies 
operating abroad, demanding that any foreign organization requesting information, assets 
or changes to contracts from strategically important companies must first seek permission 
from the Russian government” (Belton et al., 2012). Moscow is thus trying to deny the 
Commission from exercising its ‘power of inspections’ (OJ L1). 
 
In April this year, almost three years after the official proceedings were initiated, the 
Commission issued a ‘Statement of Objectives’ to Gazprom, effectively making known to the 
company on what issues the anti-trust case raised against it is being pursued. This document 
is issued according to the procedure laid out in Council Regulation 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the competition rules (OJ L1), which states that the burden of proving an 
infringement of the relevant article (in this case the prohibition in TFEU art. 102 of the abuse 
of a dominant market position) “shall rest on the party of the authority alleging the 
infringement” (OJ L1, art. 2). Gazprom’s right of defense according to art. 27 of the 
regulation is the only step that remains before the Commission can take a final decision in 
the case. It is now up to Gazprom to reply to the accusations and attend an oral hearing 
before the Commission and the national competition authorities of the parties involved 
(European Commission, 2015b). 
 
The outcome of the case is uncertain and both sides are claiming that the other is in the 
wrong. What make this case so special is the political ties of Gazprom to Moscow – 
essentially making this a dispute between The EU and Russia, elevating the case to the 
political level. It is a dispute between two ideologies of market participation. Where antitrust 
cases raised by the Commission against companies operating within the EU market are 
usually solved by private settlements, no such settlement is believed possible in the case 
against Gazprom (Riley, 2012, p. 1). As Riley argues, due to the exceptional political and 
economic circumstances of this case, it may be  
 
“…subject to full European antitrust process; a prohibition decision with fines 
attached, a series of legal challenges by Gazprom to the EU General Court and 
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onward to the European Court of Justice… its importance derives from the prospect 
that the case may lead to the dismantling of the Gazprom model…” (Riley, 2012, p. 2).   
 
Regardless of the truthfulness of the Commission’s allegations, they represent the energy 
stranglehold referred to by Tusk. Gazprom’s enormous market share in the EU gas supply 
makes Russian exploitation hard to avoid under the current structure of supply. Tusk’s 
proposal to fight power with power has been presented as a possible solution.  
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Chapter 5: The Polish proposal – evoke the EU’s countervailing power  
In this chapter I explore the details of the Polish Proposal. I start off by debunking some of 
the myths related to the content of the proposal, which have been the source of much of the 
criticism raised against Tusk’s vision.  
5.1 Debunking the myths 
The essence of the Polish Proposal was neatly, albeit misleadingly, summed up by Tusk 
himself in his financial times article A United Europe can end Russia’s Energy Stranglehold; 
“...Europe should develop a mechanism for jointly negotiating energy contracts with 
Russia… Initially, bilateral agreements would be stripped of any secret and market-
distorting clauses… a template contract would be created for all new gas contracts…” 
and “… the European Commission would be required to take a role in all new 
negotiations” (Tusk, 2014a) 
Tusk has received substantial critique for his proposed supranational coordination of gas 
purchases (e.g. Beckman (2014), Siddi (2014), Oroschakoff (2015)). Much of this criticism is, 
however, misplaced. While it is true that the crux of Tusk’s proposal is the coordination of 
gas purchases at the supranational level, he does not, as critiques argue, propose that the 
Commission shall take over the buyer role of the European gas undertakings. One critical 
voice that has certainly got it all wrong is Karel Beckman, editor-in-chief of the Energy Post, 
who wrote the following response to Tusk’s proposal:  
“Who does Mr Tusk suggest anyway would run this ‘Energy Union’? Mr Oettinger? 
Bureaucrats in Brussels would ‘ensure’ our gas supply from now on, set the prices, 
decide which member state gets how much, where the gas should be bought and at 
what price? Fortunately, most policymakers in Brussels are far too wise to be even 
tempted by such a far-fetched notion” (Beckman, 2014) 
This ridicule of Tusk’s proposal is actually based on a misquotation of his article. According to 
Beckman, Tusk suggests the breaking up of supply contracts and subsequently stripping 
them of secret and market-distorting clauses – a proposal Beckman believes to be contrary 
to the “…rule of law that I believe the EU is supposed to stand for – not some kind of 
‘solidarity’ to be decided on and doled out by politicians” (Beckman, 2014 ). What Tusk 
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argues, however, is that “…Europe should undertake the lengthier task of breaking up the 
Russian gas monopoly and restoring free market competition”. He has mentioned nothing 
about the unilateral breaking up of supply contracts. In fact, Tusk is explicitly clear on the 
fact that his proposal does not aim at altering the current division of competences between 
the member states and the EU institutions, as most certainly would have been necessitated 
should the Commission be able to determine from what suppliers and at what quantities the 
EU gas undertakings was to import;  
“This non-paper proposes a set of measures that address the EU’s energy 
dependency challenges. Its implementation could lead to the creation of a genuine 
“Energy Union” in Europe. All the measures and instruments should be introduced 
based on the Treaties with full respect for the current balance of competencies 
between the EU institutions and Member States and the sovereign right of Member 
States to determine their own energy mix. The Lisbon Treaty has created legal basis 
for EU energy policy with full respect to the Member States’ right to exploit and 
choose their own energy sources and structure their own energy supply” (Polish 
government, 2014, p. 3).   
Thus, some nuances are added. While the term ‘Energy union’ definitively has a certain 
cachet, it does not really reflect the intentions of Tusk what regards his visions for the 
Union’s external dimension – associative as it is with the decomposition of national decision 
making power over supply contracts in favor of a supranational single buyer. Rather, the 
essence of Tusk’s proposal is that all extra-EU gas sellers should face uniform trade 
conditions upon entering into supply contracts with an EU-based gas importer. Put 
differently, the trade terms facing the supplier should be equal regardless of which EU 
country or company the contract is signed with. This does not mean that a regulated EU-
wide price to be imposed – as Tusk is explicitly clear about – but rather that the price should 
not be influenced by anything other than market mechanisms (Tusk, 2014, p. 3). The 
relevant legislation that the Commission, via the Gas Supply Agency proposed by Tusk, could 
enforce under a single buyer structure is the EU competition rules and the gas market rules. 
The point of such uniform trade conditions is to eradicate the hindrance to the free flow of 
gas that non-competitive prices or various trade-distorting clauses represent. Even when 
assuming an ideal situation in which the interconnection across the EU gas market was 
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completed; if the gas that entered the market, originally identical in terms of quality, had 
attached to it unequal characteristics – most notably price -, the gas would not be able to 
compete with itself at the EU market. Regard, as an example, Russian gas sold to Germany 
and Hungary respectively; due to the price differences that is attached to these countries’ 
respective supply contracts, Russian gas is unable to compete with Russian gas. The market 
would not function properly under such conditions. This logic, which is the foundation of 
Tusk’s proposal, should be rather uncontroversial as it is the same logic that applies to the 
EU customs union. By virtue of the Customs Union, all exports to the EU internal market face 
the same customs duties upon entering the market. Within the market, however, cross-
border customs are a thing of the past (European Commission, 2014, p. 3).  
“The EU customs union is managed on the ground by 28 national customs services of 
Member States acting as if they were one…The EU is the world’s largest trading block, 
so in global terms, the EU customs union is a heavyweight in international trade. Its 
negotiating position thus outweighs that of any single Member State acting on its 
own” (European Commission, 2014, p. 3. Emphasis added).  
The logic applied in the quote above is the same that Tusk argues should be applied to the 
EU gas sector. It is essentially the same logic that is applied by the Commission in its decision 
establishing an information exchange mechanism for the compliance control of bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements related to the EU energy market:  
“The proper functioning of the internal energy market requires that the energy 
imported into the Union be fully governed by the rules establishing the internal 
energy market. An internal energy market that does not function properly puts the 
Union in a vulnerable and disadvantageous position with regard to security of energy 
supply, and undermines its potential benefits to European consumers and industry 
(Decision 994/2012/EU, point 3) 
I now turn to the details of Tusk’s proposal. 
5.2 The Polish proposal 
According to Tusk, the member states “…should take the same approach with Russia’s gas” 
as is done when the Union “…jointly buy uranium for their nuclear power plants through the 
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EU’s atomic energy agency” (Tusk, 2014). Before I analyze the degree to which such 
coordination would create sufficient leverage for the EU to countervail Russia’s market 
power, an introduction to the Atomic Energy Agency and the joint purchasing mechanism 
that lies therein is in order.  
5.2.1 The Atomic Energy Agency 
By the Atomic Energy Agency, Tusk refers to the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA). The agency is 
part of the larger institutional framework of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), which foundation is a common market for nuclear materials. This market is 
governed by a common supply policy, and ESA was established to purchase nuclear materials 
for the Union as a whole – that is, as a supranational single buyer (Euratom treaty, art. 
52.2.b). The composition of ESA and specification of its task is delineated in the Statutes of 
the Agency, which was laid down by the Council in 1958, and later amended in 2008 (OJ L 
41). It suffices here to say that ESA is subjected to the supervision of the Commission, which 
has the right to veto any of the Agency’s decisions (Euratom treaty, art. 53). In addition, the 
Commission appoints the Agency’s Director General, which is to act as the representative of 
the Agency and ensure that its tasks are carried out according to law (OJ L 41, art. 3). As such, 
the responsibility for the Community’s security of supply of nuclear materials is to be 
governed by Union policy, in contrast to security of supply of gas, which is still mainly at the 
national level. The member states are nonetheless present within the decision making 
structure of ESA via the Supervisory Committee, which is to serve as the link between the 
Agency and both producers and users in the nuclear industry” (OJ L 41, art. 13). 
As a single buyer ESA has the responsibility to ensure the “regular and equitable supply of 
ores and nuclear fuels” (Euratom treaty art. 2.d) to all contracting parties (although Euratom 
is a separate treaty, it shares the same membership base as EU), on the basis of the principle 
of “equal access to sources of supply” (Euratom treaty, art. 52.1). To enable ESA to properly 
execute this task, it was granted two important mandates; the “right of option” on all 
relevant nuclear materials produced within the territory of the Community, and the 
“exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to supply…coming from inside the Community 
or from outside” (Euratom Treaty, art. 52.2.b). This latter mandate forms the basis for the 
joint purchasing mechanism that Tusk is eager to copy in the gas sector. I will disregard ESA’s 
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right of option in the following analysis, as a Community ownership of natural gas would be 
contrary to Tusk’s explicit statement that the current division of powers is not to be altered 
under his proposal.  
5.2.2 ESA’s exclusive right to conclude supply contracts  
According to the Euratom Treaty, ESA is to have “an exclusive right to conclude contracts 
relating to the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials coming from 
inside the Community or from outside” (Euratom treaty, art. 52.2.b). Because the task of the 
Agency is to ensure an equitable supply on a non-discriminatory basis for all Community 
members, available supplies must be distributed strictly according to demand. To enable ESA 
to do so, article 60 of the Euratom Treaty states that potential users and producers shall 
inform the Agency on the supplies they require or can produce, as well as detailed 
information on quantities, physical and chemical nature, intended use, place of origin, 
delivery dates, price terms, and so on. The way in which the Agency is to balance supply and 
demand is spelled out in the ‘Rules’. 
5.2.3 The Rules 
The rules by which ESA is to balance supply against demand when carrying out its role as the 
guardian of the principle of “equal access to supplies” for all participants on the common 
market, are determined in the Rules (OJ P 32), according to art. 60 of the Euratom treaty. If 
the supply and demand of natural gas were to be balanced according to a mechanism 
modelled on the original procedure spelled out in these rules (the ordinary procedure), the 
Commission would indeed – as the critics argue – be the one pulling the strings. According to 
the ordinary procedure, ESA can determine from which producers and at what quantities the 
individual users are to be supplied, according to considerations for the Union’s overall 
security of supply. In principle however, a simplified procedure for the conclusion of supply 
contracts is consistently applied during all supply negotiations, as stipulated in art. 5 bis of 
the Rules (OJ L 193). According to this article, “users shall be authorized to invite tenders 
directly from the producers of their choice and to negotiate the supply contract freely with 
the latter” (OJ L 193, art. 5 bis, 1.a). According to art. 5 bis c, 1-7, user shall send the supply 
contract to ESA for approval within 10 workdays upon signing it, providing information on 
the following topics;  
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- the parties involved 
- the contracted quantity 
- projected delivery dates 
- nature of the materials to be supplies 
- country of origin of the materials to be supplied 
- price and terms of payment 
- contractual duration   
ESA is then to approve or reject the contract in accordance with its impact on the overall 
security of supply at the market. Supply contracts with duration of more than 10 years are to 
be subjected to Commission authorization upon signing (Euratom treaty, art. 60). As the 
Commission has the right to veto all Agency decisions, one could in theory argue that the 
Commission can veto whichever supply contract it deems unfit. For the completion of supply 
contracts related to nuclear materials, there exists – for the sake of simplicity and 
transparency - a standardized submission form that users are encouraged to make use of 
when sending in their supply contract drafts to ESA. As such, there exists no secrecy 
surrounding what requirements ESA is considering. If ESA deems a proposed contract 
compatible with the provisions and objectives of the Community, it acts as co-signer. If not, 
ESA either imposes conditions for approval or refuse to conclude the contract. All 
amendments or any supplementary agreements must also be referred to ESA for signature.  
5.3 An EU Supply Agency for natural gas 
When analyzing the potential of the Polish proposal, I will base my discussion upon the 
current division of competences between member states and the Commission. According to 
the consolidated version of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, the role of 
ensuring the functioning of the energy market and the Union’s security of supply are shared 
competences between the Union and the Member states (OJ C 326, art. 4.2.i, and in OJ C 
326, art. 194), meaning that “… the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts in that area [energy]”. The competence of the member states, however, 
shall only be exercised “to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence”. As 
such, considerations for the functioning of the market and the Union’s security of supply are 
first and foremost a matter of Union policy. However, Union policy in the realm of energy is 
limited by the exemption provided for in TFEU art. 194.2 regarding the member states’ 
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prerogative to determine the “conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice 
between energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply” (OJ C 326, art. 
194.2). A Gas Supply Agency would therefore have quite limited powers compared to ESA. 
However, as the focus of Tusk is to enable the consistent rule of law, a Gas Supply Agency 
with the task of performing ex-ante compliance controls of supply contracts according to the 
EU energy acquis might be sufficient for this purpose. The question remains whether or not 
such rule of law would produce the desired outcomes. In the next chapter, I present 
Galbraith’s theory on countervailing power in more detail. The analysis follows thereafter.    
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Chapter 6: Countervailing power  
In this chapter I present the logic underpinning Galbraith’s claim that it is the countervailing 
power of those subjected to market power that keeps the growth of private economic 
power in check, as well as under what conditions countervailing power is likely to succeed.   
6.1 American Capitalism – The Concept of Countervailing Power 
The concept of countervailing power was first introduced by John K. Galbraith in his book 
American Capitalism – The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952). In its essence, 
countervailing power refers to market power developing at either side of a market in 
reaction to market power existing at the markets opposite side – the so-called ‘original’ 
market power. As market power allows its holder to reap higher gains from trade than what 
would have been possible on a competitive market, this gain could in theory be reallocated 
to the benefit of those on the opposite side of the market, if more competitive conditions 
were established. As such, there exists an incentive for those being subjected to original 
market power to restore market balance.    
The concept of countervailing power was introduced by Galbraith as part of a debate on the 
limits of competition to inhibit the growth of market power. This debate was sparked by the 
observation that the American post-war economy, despite being founded upon an 
unshakeable belief in the virtues of competition, showed signs of increased market 
concentration. The crux of the belief in the competitive model that underpinned this 
economy – as well as all modern market economies - is the assumption that competition, 
due to its alleged self-reinforcing nature, would make the accumulation of market power 
impossible. The logic is as follows; when competition prevails, no market participant has any 
influence over the reigning market price – all actors are price takers. Thus, all attempts at 
exercising market power by overpricing or underpaying will result in a complete loss of 
market share. In the deviant case that someone is able to exercise market power, the 
associated profits of this market power would induce competitors from the same side of the 
market to try for a share, effectively reinstating competition (Galbraith, 1993, p. 112).This is 
essentially a circular argument: competition is at the same time dependent on the absence 
of market power and the ‘solution’ to market power. The problem with this logic, however, 
is that competition is regarded as the only mechanism keeping market power in check. The 
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post-war realization that market concentration suddenly had become the norm rather than 
the occasional and temporary exception thus had people believe that the economy was on 
the verge of collapse. And, indeed, if we were to follow the logic of the competitive model, 
the absence of competition should have resulted in the unlimited growth of private 
economic power, and eventually the collapse of the economic system. The American 
economy, however, prevailed. 
Galbraith argued that the explanation for why the economy had not collapsed despite the 
absence of competition was to be found in the existence of countervailing power. He refers 
in particular to the labor unions as an example of how countervailing power works to 
balance out market power. Such unions was established in order to strengthen the power of 
workers vis-à-vis employers, who, by virtue of their relative scarcity in relation to the 
abundance of workers, were in position of original market power. And it worked.   
The concept of countervailing power is by many deemed controversial (e.g. Stigler (1954)). 
That the concept is founded upon an assumption about the inherent tendency of capitalist’ 
economies to foster market concentration is particularly so (Galbraith, 1993, pp. 38-40). As 
we live in an era of profound belief in competition - at least in theory – Galbraith’s view is 
rather unsettling. The entire economic rationale for the EU customs union, the internal 
market, and now also the common energy market, is that competition will make every one 
better off.  The appeal of the competitive model is that it promises the most effective 
allocation of labor, capital and goods – and as such, the highest welfare gains. And if we 
assume that supply and demand according to the given market price is the foundation for all 
dynamics within a market – as is one of the assumptions underpinning the competitive 
model – it is a natural conclusion to argue that the model promises 
“…an economic system of high social efficiency... one in which all incentives encourages 
the employment of men, capital and natural resources in producing most efficiently what 
people most want” (freely after Galbraith, 1993, p. 12).   
Galbraith does not argue that competition is pointless. In fact, he argues that it is of utmost 
importance at the startup of all industries (Galbraith, 1993, p. 112). His point, however, is 
that the real restraint to market power is not the one provided by the other sellers eager to 
sell, or the other buyers willing to buy, but rather that ; “…private economic power is held in 
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check by the countervailing power of those who are subjected to it. The first begets the 
second” (Galbraith, 1993, p. 111). As such, the tendency towards market concentration that 
characterizes market economies is not a result of poor competition; “the causes are deeply 
organic”, inherent to the system itself (for an explanation of this, see Galbraith, 1993, p. 33).  
 
6.2 When does countervailing power succeed?  
6.2.1 Minimum opportunity and organizational capacity, and the requirement of not 
unlimited demand  
Under what conditions do buyers hold enough buyer power to successfully be able to 
countervail an existing seller power? Galbraith argues that “The development of 
countervailing power requires a certain minimum opportunity and capacity for organization” 
(Galbraith, 1993, p. 126). While it is easy to agree with Galbraith in that “it must not be 
assumed that it is easy for great numbers of individuals to coalesce and organize 
countervailing power”, the EU stands out as a specifically well suited framework for the large 
scale cooperative organization needed for countervailing power to be possible. Although 
there is disagreement among academic writers of integration theory as to whether or not 
integration within the realm of energy – characterized as high politics – is possible given the 
diverging interests of the member states, it is the case that two out of the three founding 
treaties of the EU-project were adopted in order to establish common energy markets, one 
of them governed by a single buyer arrangement (The Euratom treaty and the Treaty 
establishing the Coal and Steel Community) As such, the EU does hold the minimum 
opportunity and organizational capacity to allow for the necessary coordination, 
disregarding for the purpose of this thesis the fact that member states are likely to guard 
their energy policy against supranational involvement. Minimum opportunity is also 
provided by the fact that there are gains to be reaped from improving the governance of the 
common market for natural gas as this would increase the Union’s competitiveness, the 
Polish proposal being one possible strategy to reach this goal.   
More important for the purpose of this thesis is a second condition listed by Galbraith; the 
requirement that the balance between supply and demand be one in which the buyer has 
the potential to impose costs upon the seller through a change in own market behavior. This 
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ability depend on the state of aggregated demand; “Broadly speaking, positions of 
countervailing power have been developed in a context of … not unlimited demand” 
(Galbraith, 1993, p. 131). Galbraith explains this requirement in the following way:  
“Countervailing power, as a restraint on market power, only operated when there is a 
relative scarcity of demand. Only then is the buyer important to the seller and this is 
an obvious prerequisite for bringing his power to bear on the market power of the 
seller. If buyers are plentiful, that is, if supply is small in relations to current demand, 
the seller is under no compulsion to surrender to the bargaining power of any 
customer. The countervailing power of the buyer, however great, disappears with an 
excess of demand” (Galbraith, 1952, p. 136)  
Thus, in order to have buyer power, a buyer must have viable outside options to the 
powerful supplier, so that it can, by switching to an alternative supplier, create a scarcity of 
demand for the original supplier. What Galbraith refers to when speaking of the impact of 
the balance between supply and demand on buyer power, is what in newer academic 
literature on the topic have identified as  relative buyer size and supplier competition. While 
there is great analytical value in the conceptual framework of Galbraith, there is, however, 
an “absence of clear empirically established criteria for evaluating countervailing power” 
(Ruffle, 2005, p. 3). I thus turn to the academic litterature for further insight on the 
conditions for successful countervailing buyer power. Note, however, that most of this 
writing is concerned not with the concept of countervailing power per se, but with the 
mechanisms underpinning successful buyer power. The mechanisms, however, are the 
same..    
 
6.2.2 Support from the academic literature on why large buyers have more clout 
Snyder (1996) once argued that several empirical studies verify the conventional wisdom 
that “…relative to small buyers, large buyers have an advantage in obtaining price 
concessions from sellers” (Snyder, 1996, 747). The offered explanations for the occurrence 
of such large-buyer discounts, however, vary across the academic spectrum. Risk aversion 
has been presented as one plausible explanation. According to DeGraba (2005), large-buyer 
discounts are a result of the seller’s risk aversion (p. 2). As the possibility of not being able to 
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‘seal the deal’ with a larger buyer inhibits a larger risk to the profitability of the seller, the 
seller is willing to offer the larger buyer a price discount relative to the price offered to 
smaller buyers. “This lower price reduces the expected profit from the large customer, but 
increases the probability of making the sale” (DeGraba, 2005, p. 3). As the risks associated 
with not making a sale increases with the size of the buyer, DeGraba has dubbed this risk-
aversion explanation the “pure customer size effect” (DeGraba, 2005, p 1). The effect of an 
increase in buyer size on the risk assessment of the seller however, is eliminated if the 
growth of the buyer is caused by a proportional growth in the overall market (DeGraba, 
2005, p. 13). As such, it is the relative size of a buyer compared to the remaining market, 
which we assume remain constant, that is of importance. In a similar manner, although 
based on another mechanism, Snyder (1996; 1998) argues that it is the intense supplier 
competition that arises out of the wish to sell to a large buyer that is the origin of large-
buyer discount. According to Ruffle, Snyder’s argument is that 
“Large buyers tempt sellers to shade the monopoly price in order to capture the entire 
demand from themselves. To prevent such out-of-equilibrium deviations, sellers collude 
on lower prices against large buyers than against smaller ones, yielding the large-buyer-
discount result” (Ruffle, 2009, p. 3).   
The logic applied by DeGraba and Snyder is essentially two sides of the same story. The 
underlying mechanism in Snyder’s interpretation is that collusion between sellers is 
hampered in the presence of a large byer, as the size of the potential market makes 
undercutting and supplying more profitable than what would have been the case with a 
smaller buyer. The risk of foregoing this undercutting opportunity, potentially allowing it to 
one of the other suppliers, thus becomes too risky. This claim is supported by Dana (2004) 
and Inderst and Shaffer (2007). Thus, it is the risk aversion of the seller that creates intense 
supplier competition, and vice versa. Of course, supplier competition and risk aversion is 
only applicable to situations in which the buyer faces outside options, in terms of 
substitutability or alternative suppliers.  
Snyder’s studies are supported by Ellison and Snyder (2010), although they assign greater 
importance for buyer power to the ability of a large buyer to substitute among alternative 
suppliers - meaning that there exists supplier competition – than to sheer buyer-size. While 
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Chen (2007) argue that “…a useful indicator of buyer power is a buyer’s market share, i.e. 
the buyer’s share of purchases in the suppliers’ total sales in the relevant upstream market” 
(p. 18), Ellison and Snyder emphasizes that it is the interaction between buyers size and 
seller competition that sometimes yields large-buyer discounts. According to these authors, 
buyers facing a monopoly supplier – that is, a market in which no substitution 
opportunity/supplier competition exists – will be unable to bear power over the seller’s price 
(Ellison and Snyder, 2010, pp. 35-36). Others (e.g. Chipty and Snyder (1999); Normann, 
Ruffle and Snyder (2007); Inderst and Wey (2007)) have found that large-buyer discounts do 
occur under monopoly, so long that the joint surplus function for the market is concave in 
total output (DeGraba, 2005, p. 5). This interpretation, however, is based on a ‘matter of 
fact’ assumption about the general way in which market surplus is split between buyers and 
sellers, and does as such not really relate size to buyer power when understood as 
bargaining power vis-à-vis a strong seller. This perspective will therefore be disregarded in 
this thesis. Based on Inderst and Wey (2007), however, Le Coq and Paltseva (2012) argue 
that it is not just the fact that the loss of demand increases proportionally with the growth of 
the buyers that makes sellers willing to forego some power – it is also the fact that the freed-
up capacity becomes increasingly harder and unprofitable to reallocate to the remaining 
market. According to the authors, the freed-up capacity of a seller that results from a 
disagreement with a small buyer can rather easily be reallocated by the seller to his 
remaining buyers, as this capacity is negligible relative to the seller’s overall market share (Le 
Coq and Paltseva, 2012, p. 2). As the size of the buyer increases, however, the seller’s 
remaining market share diminishes proportionally, making the reallocation of any freed-up 
capacity more difficult (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012, p. 2). What is more, an influx of a large 
quantity to the remaining market is likely to create a downward pressure on the price that 
the seller can charge, thus reducing the seller’s profits (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012, p. 2). It is 
on this basis that Inderst and Wey (2007) argue that “the supplier’s loss from a disagreement 
increases more than proportionally with the size of the respective buyer” (p. 648). According 
to this logic, buyer power arises out of the costs that the buyer is able to impose upon the 
seller. In other words, the bargaining power of the buyer is increased because “an increase 
in the size of the buyer undermines the seller’s outside option, thereby weakening the 
seller’s bargaining position and allowing the buyer to negotiate a preferential treatment” (Le 
Coq and Paltseva, 2012,  p. 2). This logic does, however, imply that the buyer is able to 
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withholding demand, either by refraining from buyer or by directing this demand elsewhere 
– and as such, it brings us back to the requirement of outside options.  
Two conclusions can draw from the above delineated literature. First, when supplier 
competition is present, size is the thing that matters in terms of buyer power. It is the size of 
the buyer that determines the seller’s loss of demand should the buyer switch to an 
alternative supplier, as well as how large the suppliers remaining outside options are 
(remaining market share when demand from the buyer is no longer present). Second, in the 
absence of supplier competition – that is, facing a monopolist seller – size does not have an 
impact on the buyer power of a buyer. Buyers facing a monopoly seller do not have buyer 
power. The claim of Gunther Oettinger, then Energy Commissioner, that “The greater the 
monopoly of Gazprom in individual countries, the higher the price it can charge” is 
completely accurate (Euractiv, 2014)  
The emphasis of the academic literature on buyer power on the importance of supplier 
competition and sufficiently large buyer size support Galbraith’s claim that countervailing 
power only succeeds when the original market power (in this case the seller) faces a market 
situation characterized by not unlimited demand (or supply, had the original power been the 
buyer). The source of Gazprom’s market power at the EU gas market is the lack of supplier 
competition in the most import dependent Member States. The reason why the EU so far 
has been unsuccessful in countervailing Russia’s market power is that the Member States 
are unable to create for Gazprom a scarcity of demand by switching to alternative suppliers. 
As such, the crucial test of the potential of the Polish Proposal to mitigate Russia’s market 
power is whether or not the coordination of gas purchases as envisaged by Tusk would 
enable the EU to create for Gazprom a state of not unlimited demand.     
With this in mind I now turn to the analysis of the buyer power of the EU under current 
supply and demand. Will the coordination of gas purchases as proposed by Tusk allow the 
EU to accumulate enough buyer power to countervail Russia’s energy stranglehold?  
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
In the following I will analyze the buyer power of the EU vis-à-vis Gazprom under two buyer 
structure scenarios: the current uncoordinated buyer structure and an EU single buyer 
structure (the Polish Proposal). As the EU’s buyer power to a large degree depends on the 
buyer power of the most vulnerable Member States, the focus of my analysis will be what 
impact the transition from the current uncoordinated buyer structure to the single buyer 
structure proposal will have on the buyer power of Latvia, Estonia and Finland – here 
referred to as the Baltic market. While several other of the EU Member States are highly 
import dependent on Russia (e.g. Slovakia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, etc.), the Baltic 
market is the most extreme example of a buyer without buyer power, being the only group 
of Member States depending a 100 percent on Russian gas to cover domestic demand. As 
long as the buyer power of the Baltic market remains absent, Gazprom can continue to use 
its monopoly power to price discriminate or otherwise impose unfair conditions upon these 
Member States. They are the Achilles heel of the EU’s buyer power so to speak. As such, in 
order to answer my research question, it suffices to analyze the buyer power of these 
Member States under the two above mentioned scenarios. As all EU members import gas 
under long-term supply contract, their expiration is implied when I refer below to a buyer’s 
ability to switch to an alternative supplier.      
Chen (2007) argues that, in order to say something about the size and availability of outside 
options facing various actors within a given market, we must define the market. Specifically, 
Chen argue that we must limit the market to what outside options are available at low 
switching costs: “When confronted by a retailer demanding lower than normal prices, a 
supplier may want to sell its product to an alternative retailer. This option, however, may not 
be a profitable one if it faces significant costs, in which case, the alternative retailer has to be 
excluded from the relevant upstream market” (Chen, 2007, pp. 29-30). As the costs 
associated with constructing a new pipeline qualifies as a high switching cost, I will limit my 
analysis to the current import/export market facing the EU and Russia in terms of existing 
infrastructure. For the sake of illustrating the importance of outside options for buyer 
power, however, an exemption will be made in my discussion on the current buyer power of 
the Baltic market, in which I include a short reflection on what impact the realization of the 
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recent Finnish-Estonian deal to establish two LNG terminals would have on the buyer power 
of these Member States.  
As mentioned earlier, the EU imports both dry and liquefied natural gas from several extra-
EU producers. Given the current supply infrastructure, most of the Member States have 
some degree of outside options to Russian gas. The figure below illustrates existing export 
pipelines to the EU market, as well as their relative capacity. Note here that alternative 
suppliers to Russia do not have enough capacity to replace the quantities of gas currently 
supplied by Russia.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gazprom only export market for dry gas is the European continent, and the only outside 
options to the EU market available to the company is Turkey (16.5 percent) and some non-
EU Eastern European states (8.8 percent) (Gazprom, 2015a). As such, there exist a mutual 
dependency between the EU and Russia.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Current pipeline infrastructure to supply the EU, bmc/annually. Source: Holz 
et al, 2014, p. 25. 
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7.1 EU buyer power under two buyer structure scenarios  
7.1.1 Scenario one: EU buyer power under the current uncoordinated buyer structure 
Under the current buyer structure, purchases of gas from extra-EU suppliers are wholly 
uncoordinated. Supply contracts are subjected to compliance control vis-à-vis the energy 
acquis only after their ratification, and as such, it is rather easy for Gazprom to abuse its 
seller power. Under this scenario there is a clear concurrence between the outside options 
and relative size of buyers and their degree of buyer power vis-à-vis Gazprom, as predicted 
by Galbraith and the academic literature referred to in this thesis. Germany, Italy and France 
serve as good examples of Member States with buyer power, as all faces several outside 
options to Gazprom. About 50 percent of Germany’s import demand is covered by gas from 
Norway and the Netherlands, and some 13 percent is purchased as non-contracted hub gas 
(IEA, 2014). As such, by virtue of being connected to alternative suppliers, Germany faces 
low switching costs and can credibly threaten to substitute away from Russian gas when 
current supply contracts expire. The same holds true for Italy and France. Italy gets the bulk 
of its import demand covered by Algerian dry gas and LNG (32 percent), as well as gas from 
the Netherlands, Libya and Qatar (IEA, 2014). The French demand is covered mostly by gas 
from Norway (42 percent) and the Netherlands (19 percent), as well from Algeria, Nigeria 
and non-contracted hub gas (IEA, 2014). The buyer power that these Member States hold 
vis-à-vis Gazprom by virtue of having credible outside options is enhanced by the fact that 
they are all important exports markets for Russian gas, together accounting for nearly 52 % 
of Gazprom’s total EU demand (Gazprom, 2015a). If we are to follow that logic applied by Le 
Coq and Paltseva, as referred to in section 6.2.2, the large market share held by these 
countries is a source of buyer power because it would be difficult for Russia to reallocate the 
freed up capacity that would result should these Member States switch to other supplies, 
without suppressing the prices at the company’s remaining export market. Thus, by virtue of 
supplier competition and relative size, all three Member States would be able to reduce 
their demand for Russian gas if Gazprom were to impose higher prices or otherwise less 
favorable terms in a new supply contract - and in this way create a scarcity of demand; 
according to Galbraith the most important prerequisite for countervailing power. As Russia 
faces less favorable outside options than what does Germany, Italy and France due to the 
above mentioned downward pressure on prices, not reaching a supply deal with these 
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Member States would likely be relatively more costly for Russia. Much due to their 
importance as export markets – but also due to their role in setting the EU agenda – all three 
countries are for Russia what Leonard and Popescu refers to as strategic partners, meaning 
that they “enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia”, which occasionally has been pursued to 
the detriment of common EU policies (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p. 2). An example is the 
Russo-German construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which was opposed by many 
because this direct export route to Western Europe would allow Russia to circumvent the 
Eastern European market, and as such increase Russia’s ability to use gas politics in this 
market without it impacting exports to Western Europe (Pop, 2010). Some even went as far 
as dubbing the deal a second Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (e.g. Euractiv (2010); 
Petersen(2009)). For Germany, Western Europe and Russia however, it provides a direct link 
between supply and demand, circumventing both Belarus and Ukraine.  
That the above mentioned Member States have buyer power under the current EU buyer 
structure is supported by the fact that they were all able to renegotiate the price terms of 
their long-term contracts with Gazprom in 2011/2012 to a price more closely aligned with 
the one prevailing at the hubs (renegotiations were concluded for GDF SUEZ (France), 
Wingas GmbH (Germany) and Sinergie Italiane (Italy) (Gazprom, 2012). Renegotiations were 
also admitted to the Italian company ENI in 2014, involving “reduction in supply prices and 
an important change in the price indexation to fully align it with the market” (ENI, 2014). The 
alignment of the contracted price with that on the hubs is a major concession by Russia, who 
have always insisted on the continued use of oil-indexation (Gazprom, 2015).The 
background for these renegotiations was the drop in hub prices that resulted from the 
reduced demand in the aftermath of the financial crisis, as well as the influx of non-
contracted Qatari LNG – originally destined to the US market, but diverted as the demand 
decreased due to the so-called shale gas revolution. These two developments created a 
‘buyers’ market’ for gas due to the high supply relative to demand (Franza, 2014, p. 12). The 
renegotiations illustrate the importance of supplier competition on buyer power. In order to 
maintain market share, Gazprom had to concede to the requirements of the buyers.  
Germany, France and Italy represent examples of the most powerful EU buyers and as such 
stand in stark contrast to that of the Baltic market. Within this market, Gazprom has an 
absolute monopoly position as supplier. As no indigenous production is present in the Baltic 
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market, it rely a 100 percent on imports to cover demand – all of which is provided by 
Russia. The fact that these countries are isolated from the larger EU gas grid and have no 
LNG terminals enhances their vulnerable position (see figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the Baltic market is faced with a monopoly supplier, they have no buyer power. 
Finland and Estonia have, however, agreed upon the building of two LNG terminals, one in 
each country, as well as the construction of a pipeline to connect the two markets – the so-
called Balticconnector pipeline (Molin, 2014). If this plan is realized, the buyer power of 
Finland and Estonia vis-à-vis Gazprom would increase significantly. However, as Gazprom is 
shareholder in the transmission and distribution networks of all the Baltic States’, the 
realization of this project depends on the full implementation of the third energy package so 
as to ensure non-discriminatory third party access to the network for the liquefied gas 
imports. When Lithuania implemented the principles of unbundling and third party access to 
enable the transmission and distribution of LNG imports, Gazprom sued the Lithuanian 
government on the grounds that the implementation of the third energy package violated 
the privatization of Lietuvos Dujos, the largest Lithuanian gas company, of which Gazprom 
held a 37.1 percent ownership (Rapsi, 2015). As Gazprom is unable to act as both supplier 
and operator of the transmission and distribution network under the third energy package, 
 
Figure 11: Baltic pipelines. Source: Eastern European Gas Analysis, 
2014 
Baltic pipelines. Source: Eastern European Gas Analysis 2014 
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the Lithuanian implementation effectively expropriated Gazprom (Natural gas Europe, 
2015).   
Thus, in the same way as it is the supplier competition facing Germany, Italy and France that 
is their source of buyer power, it is the lack of outside options that is the crux of the non-
existent buyer power of the Baltic market. The importance of outside options for buyer 
power was recently illustrated in Lithuania, which up until last winter was - like the rest of 
the Baltic States - an energy island. Lithuania is completely dependent on imports to cover 
demand, and Russia has traditionally been the country’s only supplier. Last year a Lithuanian 
LNG terminal – appropriately named Independence - became operational, allowing Lithuania 
to import LNG from Norway. This development, which effectively ended Gazprom’s 
monopoly at the Lithuanian market, allowed Lithuania to renegotiate its Russian supply 
contracts, the result being a 20 percent price reduction (Czerwiec, 2014). While 
Independence has enough capacity to supply Estonia and Latvia in addition to Lithuania, the 
former two are currently tied to long-term supply contracts with Gazprom and are such 
unable to reap the benefits that an additional supplier could have brought to their buyer 
power.  
7.1.2 Scenario two: EU buyer power under a single buyer structure (the Polish Proposal) 
The rationale underpinning the idea of coordinating all gas purchases under a Commission 
supervised and mandatory EU wide Gas Purchasing Agency (GPA) – as proposed by Tusk – is 
that it would allow the EU to buy natural gas as a single buyer, supported by the combined 
buyer power of all the EU Member States. As Hubert and Orlova (2012) argue, “With respect 
to the outside world, political centralization yields the same result as if the national 
champions would merge into a single ‘European super champion’” (p. 17). The crux of the 
single buyer scenario is that all new supply contracts would be drafted according to a 
template contract– as is the procedure under ESA – and thereafter subjected to a uniform 
ex-ante compliance control. This coordination would allow the Union to project a truly 
common external energy policy, and as such, the EU would trade as a block, making it the 
world’s largest buyer of gas. If we are to follow the logic of Snyder, the EU would attract 
intense supplier competition when trading as a block, as the large scale supply contracts 
made possible under a single buyer scenario are lucrative for sellers because such contracts 
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provide them with enhanced security of demand and export revenues. We can thus expect 
higher degrees of supplier competition under the single buyer scenario than under the 
current scenario, and in an extension of this, lower prices due to price competition between 
the suppliers. Or at least so the story goes. While Tusk justified his proposal on the grounds 
that an Energy Union would restore competition thorough price harmonization (2014a), this 
is not necessarily the case. In response to the Polish proposal, Alexei Miller, head of 
Gazprom, warned the EU members who currently enjoy a relatively lower price on Russian 
gas imports to pursue the Energy Union project, as this would result in them paying higher 
prices. As part of this warning, Miller made the rather revealing claim that “A common price 
isn’t the lowest price. It will most obviously be the highest price” (The Economist, 2015 ). 
Since purchasing gas as a single buyer does not mitigate the problem of poor 
interconnection between the most vulnerable Member States and the overall EU gas 
market, Russia could still charge higher prices to those that have no outside options. If the 
EU is to trade as a block, Russia could impose this high price on all member states, and allow 
that those with outside options switch to other producers as a result. Since alternative 
producers do not have enough capacity to replace all Russian export to the EU, the outside 
options are rather limited when looking at the EU as a whole. Russia is aware of this. As 
Russian president Medvedev has argued, “I think that logic of European business 
cooperation won’t allow dementia to set in. Russian export restrictions are impossible” 
(Russian Times, 2014). As such, Miller does have a point. Others however, argue that the 
threat has no foundation in the reality of the situation. As argued in an article published by 
The Economist;  
“If Mr Miller imagines he could convince an all-European authority to pay as much as 
the highest price paid by any single European country, he may be inhaling too much 
of his company's fumes” (2015) 
Although the above cited argument seems rather intuitive, we must remember that the EU 
might not have any other choice than to pay the price offered by Russia.  
While an EU single buyer could result in increased price competition, it could also result in 
the opposite. Countervailing power works both ways, and suppliers might be induced to 
price collude. A scenario in which Norway joins a price collusion scheme with Russia is, 
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however, highly unlikely, and Algeria currently faces competition from the global LNG 
market and would thus loose out should it increase the prices beyond the competitive level. 
Russia and Algeria could, however, due to their importance as dry gas exporters to the EU 
(45 percent share of total EU gas import), potentially create a dry gas cartel together with 
Central Asian and Middle Eastern producers, as they have been deliberating for some while 
(Kupchinsky, 2006) . For now at least, they are competitors, and as such, do not price 
collude. Regardless, the logic applied by Tusk is that, in order for Gazprom to maintain its 
market share at the EU market under the single buyer scenario, the company would have to 
follow suit with the price development, as alternative gas suppliers would otherwise become 
more attractive for the EU, which in turn would lead to a substitution away from Russian gas 
and a scarcity of demand for Gazprom. This logic is flawed due to the above mentioned limit 
on the capacity of alternative suppliers, and it will only apply so long as there is only a few 
companies that threatens with switching suppliers. In the Western European gas market, 
some companies have successfully been able to renegotiate their supply contracts. Faced 
with competition from relatively lower prices on non-contracted hub gas, both Norway and 
Russia have been willing to renegotiate the price terms of their long-term supply contracts 
so as to ensure that more than the minimum contracted quantities under the take-or-pay 
agreements are actually taken rather than being substituted with relatively cheaper gas from 
other suppliers. Had they not been willing to do so, the buyers would have had the option to 
take the minimum quantity only, and buy the rest form the hubs. Unwillingness of the 
supplier to renegotiate could also have induced the buyers to, upon the expiry of the current 
contracts, discontinue the trade-relationship. When the Italian company ENI was denied its 
request for a price renegotiation of its long-term contract with the Algerian company 
Sonatrach, the result was instead a renegotiation of the take-or-pay clause, significantly 
reducing the contracted volumes, to the detriment of the Algerian company (Reuters, 2013 ). 
The mechanism described here, however, would not have had the same impact had all of 
the European companies with outside options threatened to substitute away from Russian 
gas – there would simply not have been enough gas to cover their demand.   
The idea that the EU is able to act as a single buyer is also somewhat flawed. While 
supranational coordination of gas purchases would certainly allow the EU to act as a de jure 
single buyer, it would not result in the EU trading as a de facto single buyer. The reason is 
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simple; the Baltic market would still only be able to import gas from Russia, and the single 
buyer scenario does therefore not mitigate the problem of Russia’s market power. As these 
Member States cannot ‘go without’, the Gas Supply Agency cannot readily refuse to co-sign 
supply contracts for this market on the ground that the contracts are in violation of the 
energy acquis.  Thus, no scarcity of demand can be created for Gazprom in the Baltic market. 
While the enhanced supplier competition under the single buyer scenario would increase 
the buyer power of the Member States that are interconnected and already faces several 
suppliers, it would not have an impact on the buyer power of the Baltic market per se. While 
it could be argued that some of the powerful buyers at the larger EU market could threaten 
to switch to alternative suppliers should Gazprom misbehave in the Baltic market, it could 
just as easily be argued that Gazprom would retaliate on this loss of market share by 
increasing the prices to this market even further. It can also be argued that Gazprom in 
general could be induced to ‘make up’ for the loss of revenue that would result from the 
relatively lower prices at the larger EU market due to supplier competition by increasing its 
prices on the Baltic market.  The allegations of price discrimination and other abuse of 
market power currently facing Gazprom has thus far not prompted a reaction from the EU 
buyers that do have buyer power under the present buyer structure – e.g. Germany and 
Italy-, and it is uncertain whether or not a single buyer scenario would yield a different 
reaction.  
The question thus remains whether or not a single buyer arrangement would be sufficient to 
mitigate Russia’s willingness to abuse its monopoly power. As Russia already regards the EU 
liberalization process as a political witch-hunt aimed solely at Gazprom’s monopoly, it is 
unlikely that the establishment of an EU wide purchasing block will create better political 
relations.   
To sum up; while the buyer power of the already powerful EU buyers would be somewhat 
enhanced under the single buyer scenario proposed by Tusk, as they would be faced with 
more supplier competition and possibly lower prices, the monopoly power of Russia would 
prevail at the Baltic market due to it being isolated from the EU gas grid. The EU would 
therefore be unable to threaten with a scarcity of demand in the parts of the market where 
such action is needed, and the single buyer scenario would therefore not allow the EU to 
countervail Russia’s market power where it is most present. Due to the limited capacity of 
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alternative suppliers, only Member States with outside options can substitute away from 
parts of the current Russian gas imports. In the long run – given that current levels of 
demand are sustained – they might need to return to Russian gas, as Russia holds the 
world’s largest reserves. The countervailing power potential of the single buyer scenario 
depends to a large degree on the risk aversion of Gazprom; will it comply not to lose market 
share in the overall EU market, or will it retaliate by increasing its current monopoly prices? 
It is therefore not possible to conclude with certainty on the effectiveness of the Polish 
proposal to mitigate Russia’s market power, although the above analysis indicates that it will 
not succeed.  
7.2 Main findings and comments 
Given the requirement of outside options/supplier competition for the success of 
countervailing power, I have found that the realization of the Polish proposal will not allow 
the EU to mitigate Russian market power in terms of facilitating buyer power for the Baltic 
market. What regards the effect on the buyer power of the Union as a whole, the results are 
less unequivocal. Had all Member States been properly connected to the EU gas grid so that 
gas could flow freely between all suppliers and national markets, the single buyer scenario 
would likely enhance the buyer power of both the Baltic market and the EU at large. As the 
countervailing potential of the single buyer scenario rests upon the willingness of the 
Member States with buyer power to retaliate Gazprom’s abusive market behavior in the 
Baltic market by substituting Russian gas with alternative gas supplies – an option that is 
limited by the insufficient capacity of alternative producers - as well as Russia’s risk-aversion, 
it is impossible to conclude with certainty what impact the pooling of buyer power at a 
supranational level would have on Russia’s market power. Given that Gazprom has a 
reputation for not complying with the EU energy acquis – which we must not forget is 
already present despite compliance controls only being possible after supply contracts 
become operative – as well as the unwillingness of the current powerful buyers to retaliate 
against Russian market abuse, the most appropriate conclusion is that a single buyer 
scenario under the current levels of interconnectedness would not allow the EU to 
countervail Russia’s market power – neither directly or indirectly.  
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If we compare these results with the levels of buyer power that would have been possible 
under the current buyer structure and the single buyer structure in a fully integrated market, 
we see that it is not the buyer structure that is the problem, but rather the levels of 
interconnectedness (see figure 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Had the market been fully integrated so that supplier competition was possible at the Baltic 
market, the buyer power of this market would have been increased even under the current 
buyer structure. As such, it would be wiser for the EU to focus on a strategy for completing 
the common gas market in terms of interconnection rather than on a strategy for the 
coordination of gas purchases. Development of infrastructure is, however, devoted a 
separate 'pillar' in the Polish proposal, a fact which is not included in this thesis. The idea of 
coordinating all gas purchases under a single supranational regulatory body should 
nonetheless not be discarded. If the EU is able to improve the levels of interconnectedness 
between the Member States, a single buyer scenario would definitely yield enhanced ‘buyer 
power clout’ compared to the current situation. More importantly, it would allow the EU 
 
Fragmented market 
(current) 
Integrated market  
Figure 12: Comparison of buyer power in a fragmented vs. an integrated EU 
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improved oversight of the market situation at all times, which would make it easier to 
formulate new strategies for how best to cope with issues of security of supply. For now, 
emancipation from Russian gas seems impossible so long as the current gas demand is 
sustained. This realization – which many has overlooked- might give new political impetus to 
exploring the possibilities that lies within renewable energy.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The research question of this thesis is whether or not the establishment of an EU single gas 
buyer will allow the EU to countervail Russia’s market power on the EU gas market. I have 
analyzed this question according to the Polish proposal, in which Tusk spells out how such a 
single buyer arrangement should be organized. My analysis have been guided by the 
conceptual framework of countervailing power provided by Galbraith, as well as recent 
academic literature on buyer power. I have focused on what effect a transition from the 
current uncoordinated buyer structure to the single buyer structure would have on the 
buyer power of the Baltic market (Lativa, Estonia and Finland). This choice is justified on the 
grounds that the Baltic market have the least buyer power vis-à-vis Gazprom of all the EU 
Member States, and as such represent the Achilles heel of the EU’s overall buyer power vis-
à-vis the company; if the buyer power of this market is not enhanced under the single buyer 
structure, the EU will not be able to countervail Russia’s market power in the areas of the EU 
market where it is most needed.  
I have analyzed the potential of the Polish proposal to enable the EU to countervail Russia’s 
market power according to the two conditions for effective countervailing power identified 
by Galbraith. I have argued that the EU holds both the minimum opportunity for, and 
organizational capability to coordinate all Member States behind a common position vis-à-
vis Gazprom – the first condition for effective countervailing power - as such coordination 
has been achieved before (Euratom; The single market). The second condition identified by 
Galbraith, that the buyer wishing to countervail the power of a seller must be able to create 
a state of not unlimited demand for said seller, has been analyzed in detail under both the 
current buyer structure and the single buyer structure. I have argued that, according to the 
literature on buyer power, the ability of a buyer to create a state of not unlimited demand 
depends on what outside options exists for the buyer in the relevant market, and as such 
found that a prerequisite for countervailing power is supplier competition. When supplier 
competition is present, relative buyer size enhances the effects of countervailing power as a 
larger buyer naturally can threaten to withhold (direct towards another supplier) a relatively 
higher demand than what can a smaller buyer. 
66 
 
I have found that the requirement of supplier competition is unfulfilled for the Baltic market 
under both scenarios. What regards the EU single buyer scenario I have argued that, 
although the buyer power of the already powerful and well diversified Member States would 
increase, such a buyer structure will not increase the buyer power of the Baltic market per 
se. It is uncertain whether or not the increase in buyer power of the already powerful and 
diversified Member States – which most likely will create a pressure on Russia to comply 
with the energy acquis on a regional basis – will induce Russia to end its energy stranglehold 
over the Member States in which it still has monopoly supplier power. What is more, as 
alternative suppliers do not have enough capacity to replace the totality of Russian gas 
imports to the larger EU market, the outside options of the EU is limited. The Union will 
therefore be unable to create a large enough scarcity of demand to force Russia to comply, 
and it is very likely that Russia will react on efforts to substitute away from Russian gas by 
increasing the prices for those that have no outside option. If we expand the scope of this 
thesis to also include the threat of supply cut-offs, it is obvious that Russia has the upper 
hand regardless of how the EU structures its gas purchases. We must also take into 
consideration that Russia holds the world’s largest reserves of natural gas. It is therefore 
impossible for the EU to emancipate itself from Russian gas so long as the current level of 
demand is sustained, both in the present and in the long term.  
An observation arising out of my analysis is the fact that it is not the lack of coordination of 
supply contracts that is the main barrier to EU buyer power, but rather the lack of 
interconnection. Subjecting supply contract with extra-EU producers to an ex-ante 
Commission supervised compliance control with the energy acquis – the crux of the Polish 
proposal – would nonetheless serve to enhance the functioning of the EU energy market 
through improved market monitoring and law abidance (albeit not necessarily by Russia). 
What is more, the realization of the Polish proposal would create for the EU a much needed 
common external energy policy, effectively enabling the Union to speak with one voice 
abroad.  
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